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Abstract 
Drawing inspiration from institutional theory, a small sub-stream of literature has proposed 
that participation in the informal economy arises from the lack of alignment of D VRFLHW\¶V
formal institutions (i.e., its codified laws and regulations) with its informal institutions (i.e., 
the norms, values and beliefs of its population). To further advance this explanation, this 
paper reports a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 27,563 face-to-face interviews across 
28 European countries. The finding is that there is a strong association between the degree to 
which formal and informal institutions are unaligned and participation in the informal 
economy. The greater is the asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions, the 
more likely is participation in the informal economy at both the individual-, population group- 
and country-level. A new policy approach for tackling the informal economy which focuses 
upon reducing this institutional incongruence is then discussed.   
 
Keywords: informal sector; informal employment; undeclared economy; institutional theory; 
European Union 
 
Introduction 
Over the past decade or so, a burgeoning literature has drawn attention to the prevalence of 
the informal economy across the globe (ILO, 2013; Jütting and Laiglesia, 2009; Schneider 
and Williams, 2013) and its important role in helping people get-by (Round et al., 2010; 
Wallace and Latcheva, 2006; Williams et al., 2013). With some estimates suggesting that 60% 
of the global workforce have their main job in the informal economy (Jütting and Laiglesia, 
2009), tackling the informal economy is now a key issue on the policy agenda of supra-
national agencies and governments across the globe (European Commission, 2007; ILO, 
2014; OECD, 2014; Williams, 2014a). This is not simply because of the resultant public 
revenue losses but also due to the poorer working conditions that exist in the informal 
economy as well as the unfair competition legitimate businesses face (Andrews et al., 2011; 
ILO, 2014; TUC, 2008).  
In this paper, the intention is to advance a little discussed way of explaining and 
tackling the informal economy grounded in institutional theory (for exceptions, see Feige, 
1997; Gërxhani, 2004a,b). All societies have formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and 
regulations) that define the legal rules of the game and informal institutions which are socially 
shared unwritten rules that express the wider norms, values and beliefs of the population 
(Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). The resultant 
proposition is that the greater is the non-alignment of these formal and informal institutions, 
the greater is the likelihood of participation in the informal economy. In this paper, the aim is 
to evaluate the validity of this institutional incongruence thesis as an explanation for the 
informal economy at the individual-, population group- and country-level, and to discuss the 
implications for tackling this sphere.  
This paper thus advances understanding of the informal economy in three ways. From 
a theoretical perspective, we build upon the institutionalist theorisation of the informal 
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economy discussed by Feige (1997) and Gërxhani (2004a,b), but which has subsequently 
received little attention, by advancing the proposition that the greater is the asymmetry 
between formal and informal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of participation in the 
informal economy. From an empirical viewpoint meanwhile, we provide evidence of a strong 
relationship between the degree of institutional incongruence and the level of participation in 
the informal economy at not only the country- but also the individual- and population-group 
levels by reporting a fresh 28-country data-set. Finally, and from a policy perspective, we for 
the first time discuss the implications for policy of adopting this institutional incongruence 
explanation of the informal economy.  
To do this, the next section briefly reviews previous explanations for participation in 
the informal economy along with how institutional theory provides a new lens for doing so 
that overcomes the limitations of previous approaches. To test the proposition that the 
propensity to participate in the informal economy is associated with the degree of institutional 
incongruence, the third section then introduces the data set used, namely a 2013 survey 
involving 27,563 face-to-face interviews in the 28 member states of the European Union 
(EU28), followed in the fourth section by the results. The fifth section then discusses the 
theoretical and policy implications of the findings before the final section summarises the 
consequences for explaining and tackling the informal economy. 
 At the outset however, the informal economy must be defined. Castells and Portes 
(1989: 15) define informal work DV µD VSHFLILF IRUP RI LQFRPH JHQHUDWLQJ SURGXFWLRQ«
unregulated by the institutions of society in a legal and social environment in which similar 
DFWLYLWLHVDUH UHJXODWHG¶$OWKRXJK this defines the informal economy in relation to both the 
IRUPDOµOHJDO¶DQGLQIRUPDOµVRFLDO¶LQVWLWXWLRQVLQDVRFLHW\LWIDLOVWRUHFRJQLVHILUVWO\WKDW
although the informal economy is unregulated by formal institutions, it is regulated by the 
rules of informal institutions and secondly, that although the informal economy is deemed 
µLOOHJDO¶ IURP WKH YLHZSRLQW RI IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV LW LV UHJDUGHG DV µOHJLWLPDWH¶ IURP WKH
viewpoint of informal institutions (Webb et al., 2009). Here in consequence, and mirroring the 
consensus in the literature, the informal economy is defined as socially legitimate activity 
which is formally legal in every respect except that it is not declared to the authorities for tax, 
social security and/or labour law purposes (European Commission, 2007; OECD, 2012; 
Schneider, 2008; Schneider and Williams, 2013). If an economic activity is not legal and 
legitimate in every other respect, it is not here deemed as belonging to the informal economy. 
For example, if activities are unpaid then they are SDUWRIWKHµXQSDLGHFRQRP\¶DQG if both 
formally illegal and socially illegitimate SDUW RI WKH ZLGHU µFULPLQDO¶ HFRQRP\ (Williams, 
2004). Of course, fuzzy edges exist such as when gifts or reciprocal labour are received 
instead of money. In this paper however, only paid activities are included in the definition of 
informal work.  
 
Participation in the informal economy and institutional theory 
Numerous recent studies chart the variations in participation in the informal economy  not only 
across global regions (ILO, 2012), cross-nationally (Schneider and Williams, 2013) and across 
localities and regions (Kesteloot and Meert, 1999), but also by employment status (Leonard, 
1994; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013), gender (ILO, 2013; Leonard, 1994, 1998) and income 
level (Williams, 2004). This has resulted in a more contextualised understanding of 
participation in the informal economy (Pfau-Effinger, 2009). 
 To explain participation in the informal economy meanwhile, commentators have 
largely adopted one of two broad perspectives. On the one hand, and grounded in a 
structuralist perspective, participation in the informal economy is viewed to result from 
peRSOH¶Vµexclusion¶ from state benefits and the formal labour market. Viewing the informal 
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economy as an inherent feature of contemporary capitalism and a direct result of employers 
seeking to reduce costs, such as by sub-contracting to businesses employing informal labour 
XQGHU µVZHDWVKRS-OLNH¶ FRQGLWLRQV (e.g., Hapke, 2004; Ross, 2004) and the µSUHFDULRXV¶ RU
µIDOVH¶ VHOI-employed, informal workers are characterised as marginalised populations 
conducting such work out of necessity and as a last resort (Davis, 2006; Roberts, 2013; 
Slavnic, 2010).     
 On the other hand, another view is that participation in the informal economy is driven 
more by a voluntary decision to µexit¶ the formal economy, rather than a result of involuntary 
exclusion (Cross, 2000; Snyder, 2004). Conventionally, such commentators have depicted 
informal workers as heroes casting off the shackles of a burdensome state so as to avoid the 
costs, time and effort of formal registration (De Soto, 1989, 2001). More recently however, 
this µexit¶ perspective has also been argued by a wider collection of both public choice 
scholars (for a review, see Gërxhani, 2004b) as well as critical, post-colonial, post-
structuralist, post-development and post-capitalist scholars seeking to transcend the 
conventional µthin¶ depiction of monetary exchange as universally market-like and profit-
driven by adopting µthicker¶ portrayals that unpack the messy logics of monetized transactions 
(Escobar 1995; Zelizer 2005). For example, this has been argued by those drawing attention 
to how informal work is often conducted for and by kin, neighbours, friends and 
acquaintances and for reasons other than purely financial gain (Persson and Malmer, 2006; 
Round and Williams, 2008; Williams, 2004; Williams and Round, 2008, 2010).  
 Rather than depict informal workers as either universally exit- or exclusion-driven, as 
is the case in these two conventional approaches, a second wave of thought has adopted a 
more nuanced understanding. This evaluates the ratio of exit-driven to exclusion-driven 
informal workers. Studies have found that µexclusion¶ is more applicable to those engaged in  
waged informal employment and µexit¶ to own-account informal workers (Chen, 2012; Perry 
and Maloney, 2007), exclusion more relevant in relatively deprived populations and exit in 
relatively affluent groups (Gurtoo and Williams, 2009), exit more relevant in developed 
economies and exclusion in developing countries (Gërxhani, 2004a; Maloney, 2004; Oviedo 
et al., 2009) and exclusion more relevant to women informal workers and exit rationales to 
men (Franck, 2012; Grant, 2013; Williams et al., 2013).  
Although this second wave of thought transcends the universal hues of previous 
approaches, informal workers have continued to be seen as either exit- or exclusion-driven; 
exit and exclusion are portrayed as separate categories constituted via their negation to each 
other (i.e., doing so for exit rationales means that an informal worker is not doing so for 
exclusion rationales). However, a third wave of thought has begun to question this 
separateness of exit- and exclusion-drivers, revealing how a significant proportion of informal 
workers voice both exit as well as exclusion rationales when explaining their participation 
(Adom, 2014; Eurofound, 2013; Snyder, 2004; Williams et al., 2011, 2013). This has brought 
starkly into question the very relevance of differentiating participants according to whether 
they are driven by exit or exclusion. Given this, the intention here turns towards an alternative 
and so far little discussed way of explaining participation in the informal economy.    
In institutional theory, institutions are often defined as the cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures that give stability and meaning to social behaviour (Scott, 1995). 
Institutions or governance mechanisms exist in every society (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; 
North, 1990). On the one hand, there are formal institutions, which are the codified laws and 
regulations. On the other hand, there are informal institutions, which are the µVRFLDOO\VKDUHG
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially 
VDQFWLRQHGFKDQQHOV¶+HOPNHDQG/HYLWVN\, 2004: 727); the norms, values and beliefs held by 
citizens which reflect their individual morality about what is right (Denzau and North, 1994).  
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7KH QRUPV YDOXHV DQG EHOLHIV RI D VRFLHW\¶V LQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV can be either 
µFRPSOHPHQWDU\¶ LI WKH\ UHLQIRUFH IRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQV RU µVXEVWLWXWLYH¶ LI WKH UXOHV Whey 
prescribe are incompatible with the formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; North, 
1990). When there is symmetry between the formal and informal institutions therefore, the 
informal economy will be largely absent since citizens will adhere to the legal rules of the 
game. The only reason informality will take place is because citizens unintentionally do so, 
such as due to the rules being not simple enough to understand or to complex too fulfil. 
However, if asymmetry exists EHWZHHQD VRFLHW\¶V IRUmal and informal institutions, such as 
due to a lack of trust in government, the informal economy will be larger. As Feige (1997: 22) 
states, µWhen formal and informal institutions clash, non-compliant behaviors proliferate¶. 
Indeed, since the turn of the millennium, numerous empirical studies RIµWD[PRUDOH¶
have revealed not only a close relationship between attitudes and behaviours at the cross-
national level (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Halla, 2010; Richardson, 2006; Torgler, 2011; Torgler 
and Schneider 2007) but also how participation in the informal economy is deemed more 
acceptable by men, single people, the unemployed and self-employed, and its acceptability 
reduces with religiosity, age, social status and income but increases with years spent in formal 
education (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Daude et al., 2013; Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010; 
Williams and Martinez, 2014). Until now however, with the exception of Gerxhani (2004a,b), 
no studies have recognised that the degree to which it is socially acceptable to participate in 
the informal economy is a measure of the level of institutional incongruence.  
Here, therefore, the proposition to be tested is that the greater is the non-alignment of 
formal and informal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy. The next section outlines the methodology used in this paper to test this 
institutional incongruence thesis. 
 
Methodology: data, variables and analytical methods 
Data 
This paper reports data from 27,563 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 across the 28 
member states of the European Union (EU-28) about both participation in informal work and 
their views regarding the social acceptability of informal work. Interviews were conducted in 
the national language with adults aged 15 years and older. In every country, a multi-stage 
random (probability) sampling methodology was used (the number of interviews varying from 
500 in smaller countries to 1,500 in larger nations). This ensured that on the issues of gender, 
age, region and locality size, each country as well as each level of sample is representative in 
proportion to its population size. Therefore, for the univariate analysis we employ the sample 
weighting scheme, as recommended in both the wider literature (Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon 
et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) and the Eurobarometer methodology which explicitly 
recommends usage of the weighting scheme to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the 
multivariate analysis however, debate exists over whether such a weighting scheme should be 
used (Pfefferman, 1994; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 
1994). Given that the majority opinion in the literature suggests that the weighting scheme 
should not be used for multivariate analysis, this option was chosen. 
The face-to-face interviews adopted a gradual approach in order to build rapport with 
the participants before asking sensitive questions. Firstly, questions were asked on whether 
participants had purchased goods and services on an informal basis, secondly, envelope 
wages, thirdly, whether respondents had engaged in informal work themselves and finally, 
their attitudes regarding the acceptability of participating in informal work. In this article, we 
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confine discussion to the questions on participation in informal work and their attitudes 
regarding the acceptability of participation.  
 
Variables 
To analyse the institutional incongruence thesis, the dependent variable is whether people 
participated in the informal economy. This is based on their response to the question: 
µUndeclared work is a relatively common and socially acceptable activity, and refers to 
activities which were not or not fully reported to the tax or social security authorities and 
where the person who acquired the good or service was aware of this. Apart from regular 
employment, have you yourself carried out any informal paid activities in the last 12 
months?¶ By including a definition of informal work, this question avoided participants 
defining the informal economy in different ways. Social desirability bias meanwhile, was 
reduced by firstly, putting this more sensitive question later after building rapport with the 
interviewer, secondly, using a µIDFH-VDYLQJ¶ WHFKQLTXH which framed the question as non-
judgementally as possible by stating before asking that this type of activity is relatively 
common and acceptable within social norms, thus helping to µOHJLWLPLVH¶DGPLssion to certain 
behaviours and thirdly, through repeated reassurances of anonymity, reminding respondents 
of the commitment to confidentiality. Given that previous studies find participants openly 
discuss such activity with researchers (Ram and Williams, 2008), there is little reason to 
assume that participants will have hidden their informal work from the interviewer. This is 
UHLQIRUFHG H[DPLQLQJ LQWHUYLHZHUV¶ UHVSRQVHV UHJDUGLQJ WKH SHUFHLYHG reliability of the 
interviews. In 88% of cases, interviewers reported good or excellent cooperation, in 10% fair 
cooperation and in only 2% bad cooperation. Nevertheless, the estimates of participation are 
perhaps best treated as lower-bound estimates.  
To analyse the proposition that the uneven distribution of informal work is associated 
with the degree of institutional asymmetry, participants were asked to rate how acceptable 
they viewed six informal work behaviours using a 10-SRLQWVFDOHZKHUHPHDQVµDEVROXWHO\
XQDFFHSWDEOH¶DQGPHDQVµDEVROXWHO\DFFHSWDEOH¶ These are: a firm is hired by another firm 
and does not report earnings; a firm hires a private person and all or part of their salary is not 
GHFODUHGDILUPLVKLUHGE\DKRXVHKROGDQGGRHVQ¶WUHSRUWHDUQLQJVVRPHRQHHYDGHVWD[HVE\
not or only partially declaring income; someone receives welfare payments without 
entitlement and a person hired by a household does not declare earnings when it should be 
declared. A tax morality index was then calculated using the mean score across these six 
attitudinal questions about the acceptability of participating in informal work. 
Meanwhile, and as Table 2 below depicts, the independent variables held constant in 
order to investigate this, and to analyse which population groups are more likely to participate 
in informal work, included socio-demographic variables (gender, age, marital status, social 
class, age stopped full-time education, number of people in household, presence of children), 
socio-economic variables (employment status and whether they have difficulties paying 
household bills) and spatial variables (European region, area respondent lives). All these 
independent variables have been also shown in previous studies to influence the level of 
participation in the informal economy (ILO, 2013; Persson and Malmer, 2006; Pfau-Effinger, 
2009; Williams, 2004). 
 
Analytical methods 
To analyse whether informal work is greater amongst individuals expressing lower levels of 
tax morality, and given the nonparametric nature of the data, a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-
sum (Mann-Whitney) test is firstly used. Meanwhile, to examine whether the cross-national 
variations in informal work are associated with the cross-national variations in tax morality, 
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and again due to the nonparametric nature of the data, a 6SHDUPDQ¶VELYDULDWHFRUUHODWLRQ LV
used to evaluate whether a statistically significant relationship exists. To further analyse 
whether this institutional asymmetry explanation for informal work holds when other socio-
demographic, socio-economic and spatial variables are held constant, and also to analyse the 
population groups most likely to engage in informal work in order to understand who should 
be targeted, a logistic regression analysis is then conducted utilizing the hierarchical nature of 
the data (individuals within countries). Below we report the findings.  
 
Findings 
Across the EU-28, 3.8% (1 in 26) of the 27,563 participants report undertaking informal work 
in the year prior to the survey. Only 3% refused to answer or said that they did not know. Is it 
the case therefore, that the norms, values and beliefs of those engaged in informal work are 
less aligned with state morality than those who do not?  
To evaluate this, we test whether the tax morality of individuals engaged in informal 
work is lower than the tax morality of those not engaging in informal work. Given that the 
distribution of tax morality is non-parametric, a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test, also known as the 
Mann-Whitney two-sample statistic, is used. The finding is a strong statistically significant 
difference in the median tax morality of those engaged in informal work, which is 3.5 (where 
1 means the non-FRPSOLDQFHDFWLYLWLHVDUHYLHZHGDVµDEVROXWHO\XQDFFHSWDEOH¶DQGPHDQV
WKH\ YLHZ WKHP DV µDEVROXWHO\ DFFHSWDEOH¶ compared with those not engaging in informal 
work, whose median score is 1.83. Those engaging in informal work thus have a significantly 
lower tax morality than those not participating in informal work. This provides some initial 
support for the institutional incongruence thesis at the individual-level.  
 Is it also the case that those countries with a greater propensity to engage in informal 
work have a lower tax morality? To investigate this, Table 1 reports the cross-national 
variations in the level of participation in informal work across the EU-28 as well as the cross-
national variations in the level of tax morality. This reveals not only the uneven participation 
in informal work across countries, ranging from 11% in Estonia, Latvia, and Netherlands to 
1% in Malta, but also the cross-national variations in the level of tax morality, ranging from a 
mean composite score of 3.90 in Latvia to 1.49 in Cyprus. Largely however, and despite such 
differences, informal work is viewed as unacceptable in the EU-28. Evaluating the 
relationship between cross-national variations in the level of participation in informal work 
DQGWD[PRUDOLW\DVLPSOH6SHDUPDQ¶VELYDULDWHFRUUHODWLRQUHYHDOVDYDOXHRIUKR DQG
thus a strong significant (p<0.001***) relationship. This provides further support for the 
institutional incongruence thesis. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Turning to the variations across population groups in participation in informal work and tax 
morality, Table 2 reveals that men and younger age groups participate more than women and 
older age groups in informal work and also have a lower tax morality. Similarly, it displays on 
the issues of marital status and social class that those least likely to participate in the informal 
economy (i.e., married/remarried/widowed people and the middle/upper class) also have the 
highest tax morality. Moreover, the age education ended and level of affluence displays 
similar patterns. Those displaying higher levels of participation in informal work (i.e., those 
whose education ended between 16-19 years old and those still studying, and those who have 
difficulties paying the household bills most of the time, or from time to time ) also have lower 
levels of tax morality. The clear intimation is that those population groups displaying a lower 
tax morality are more likely to engage in informal work.    
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INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
To determine whether this association remains when other characteristics are taken into 
account and held constant, Table 3 reports the results of a multilevel mixed-effects logistic 
regression analysis. The first row in models 1-3 reveals that the propensity of individuals to 
participate in informal work remains strongly associated with their level of tax morality, and 
that this remains the case whether socio-demographic, socio-economic or spatial 
characteristics are added and held constant. This therefore provides further support for the 
institutional incongruence thesis.   
This regression analysis also identifies whether the above discussed socio-
demographic, socio-economic and spatial variations regarding participation in informal work 
remain significant when the other factors are held constant. As Model 1 in Table 3 reveals, 
when other socio-demographic factors are held constant, men, younger age groups, the 
divorced/separate, people reporting themselves as working class and single person households 
are significantly more likely to undertake informal work than women, older age groups, 
married/remarried people, the middle or higher class and households with multiple adults 
respectively. However, the age education ended is not significantly associated with 
participation in informal work once other socio-demographic characteristics are taken into 
account.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
When Model 2 adds socio-economic factors, there are no major changes to the influence of 
the socio-demographic variables on participation in informal work. However, the additional 
finding is that the unemployed are significantly more likely to participate in informal work 
than those in formal employment, as are those who have difficulties paying the household 
bills most of the time. When spatial factors are added in Model 3, there are again no major 
changes to the significance of the socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics that 
influence participation in informal work. However, although whether one is in an urban or 
rural area makes no difference, those living in the more affluent Nordic nations are more 
likely to participate in informal work than those living in Western Europe, and those living in 
Southern Europe less likely.   
 
Discussion 
Evaluating the validity of the institutional incongruence explanation therefore, this analysis of 
the 2013 Eurobarometer survey reveals a strong association between the level of participation 
in informal work and the degree of institutional incongruence. Not only is the likelihood of 
participation in informal work higher amongst those individuals whose beliefs regarding tax 
compliance are more at odds with the formal rules, but also amongst population groups and 
countries where the level of institutional incongruence is higher, even when other variables 
are introduced and held constant. Hence, the higher is the asymmetry between formal and 
informal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of participation in the informal economy. 
This institutional incongruence thesis is valid not only across individuals and population 
groups but also countries.    
To tackle informal work therefore, it appears necessary to reduce this institutional 
incongruence. This requires a rather different policy approach towards informal work than so 
far pursued. Conventionally, governments have employed direct controls to ensure that the 
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cost of being caught and punished is higher than the pay-off from informal work, largely 
achieved by increasing the actual and perceived risks and costs associated with participation, 
such as by increasing the number of workplace inspections and probability of detection (see 
Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). More recently moreover, greater attention has begun to be 
given to making participation in formal work easier and more beneficial such as by 
simplifying compliance processes (Williams, 2014a). The above findings however, suggest 
that this is not the way forward.  
What is instead needed is to focus upon decreasing the level of institutional 
incongruence. To achieve this, lessons can be learned from studies that have sought to elicit 
behaviour change in workers at the organisational level where there has been a shift from 
µKDUG¶ WR µVRIW¶ human resource management (HRM), and from bureaucratic to post-
bureaucratic management (Legge, 1995; Thompson and Alvesson, 2005; Watson, 2003). 
Here, a similar shift is advocated but at the societal level. Conventionally, the equivalent of a 
µKDUG¶+50RUEXUHDXFUDWLFPDQDJHPHQWDSSURDFKKDVEHHQDGRSWHGby governments when 
tackling informal work. Compliance of the population and behaviour change has been sought 
through the use of tight rules, prescribed procedures, close supervision and monitoring and 
centralised structures within the context of a low trust, low commitment and adversarial 
FXOWXUHLQZKLFKDµFRSVDQGUREEHUV¶DSSURDFKLVpursued. Following the lead of soft HRM 
and post-bureaucratic management at the organisation level however, what is here advocated 
at the societal-level is a high trust, high commitment culture that aligns the values of citizens 
with the formal institutions so as to generate internal or self-regulated control.  
To achieve this symmetry between formal and informal institutions, changes in not 
only the informal institutions but also formal institutions are required. To change the socially 
shared rules that lead populations to flout the formal rules and engage in informal work, at 
least three policy initiatives can be pursued. Firstly, tax education is required to re-align their 
values with the formal rules and encourage greater self-regulation. Taxes, after all, are the 
prices Europeans pay for the public goods and services they receive. Until now, however, it 
has been rare in European societies for governments to inform their citizens explicitly of the 
public goods and services received for the taxes they pay (Saeed and Shah, 2011). Secondly, 
advertising campaigns can be used, which inform citizens of the costs and risks of informal 
work and/or benefits of formal work (OECD, 2012; Williams, 2014a). And third and finally, 
normative appeals to citizens can be employed such as signs stating µ\RXUWD[HVSDLGIRUWKLV¶
on roadsides, in hospitals and outside schools.  
 To improve the social contract between governments and citizens nevertheless, it is 
not just a case of persuading citizens to abide by the codified laws and regulations. Formal 
institutions need to change. Populations will not improve their tax morality if there remains a 
low level of trust in government and a widespread perception of public sector corruption, as is 
the case in many European countries (European Commission, 2014). A modernisation of 
government and governance is thus necessary. This requires at least three institutional 
reforms. Firstly, procedural justice must be improved, which in the instance of informal work 
refers to the tax authority treating citizens in a more respectful, impartial and responsible 
manner and a shift towards a service-oriented approach when dealing with them (Murphy, 
2005). If they view governments as treating them in such a manner, then they will be more 
likely to engage in self-regulated compliant behaviour. Secondly, procedural fairness must be 
enhanced which refers to citizens believing that they pay their fair share compared with others 
(Molero and Pujol, 2012; Wenzel, 2006). Citizens who receive procedurally fair treatment 
will be more likely to trust the authorities and will be more inclined to accept its decisions and 
follow its directions. Third and finally, redistributive justice will need to be improved which 
relates to citizens believing that they receive the goods and services they deserve given the 
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taxes they pay (Kirchgässner, 2010). Citizens see themselves as more justified being non-
compliant and breaking the social contract with the state, the less they perceive the system as 
just. To attain institutional symmetry therefore, the system should be perceived as just. 
Importantly, Table 3 identifies the population groups that such measures need to target, 
namely men, younger age groups, those who are divorced or separated, those defining 
themselves as working class, the unemployed, single-person households and those with 
difficulties paying the household bills.  
It is not just the processes of formal institutions however, that need to change if 
institutional asymmetry is to be reduced and a high-commitment culture based on self-
regulation is to be achieved. There is also a need to change the products of formal institutions 
by pursuing wider economic and social developments. Previous studies reveal that the 
informal economy is smaller in wealthier economies with stable high quality government 
bureaucracies and those with lower poverty levels, more equality, greater levels of social 
protection, more effective redistribution via social transfers and greater state intervention in 
the labour market to protect vulnerable groups (Vanderseypen et al., 2013; Williams, 2013, 
2014b; Williams et al., 2013a)1. This displays therefore, that formal institutions need to not 
only change their processes but also their products if institutional asymmetry is to be reduced.   
 
Conclusions 
This paper has sought to advance a so far little discussed way of explaining and tackling 
informal work. Drawing upon institutionalist theory, it has proposed that the greater is the 
asymmetry between formal and informal institutions and thus the gap between state morality 
and individual morality, the higher is the propensity to engage in such practices both at the 
individual-, population group- and country-level.  
To decrease the prevalence of informal work in consequence, a shift is required away 
from direct controls that seek to detect and punish these practices and towards eliciting a high 
trust high commitment culture so as to align the informal and formal institutions. On the one 
hand, this requires alterations in the informal institutions, using measures such as tax 
education, awareness raising campaigns and normative appeals. Indeed, this paper has 
identified the groups that need targeting, namely men, younger age groups, those who are 
divorced or separated, those defining themselves as working class, the unemployed, single-
person households and those with difficulties paying the household bills. On the other hand, it 
also requires alterations in the formal institutions. Changes are required not only in the 
processes of formal institutions to improve trust in government by developing greater 
procedural and redistributive justice and fairness, but also changes in the products of these 
formal institutions. These include the pursuit of stable high quality government bureaucracies 
and lower poverty levels, more equality, greater levels of social protection, more effective 
redistribution via social transfers and greater state intervention in the labour market to protect 
vulnerable groups. 
 A limitation of this study is that it has not analysed how formal institutions vary across 
countries and how this influences the degree of institutional incongruence. It has only 
analysed the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions by examining the degree to 
which the attitudes (informal institutions) of different individuals and populations adhere to 
                                                          
1
 Although participation rates are higher in many countries displaying these characteristics (e.g., Nordic nations), 
this does not mean that the informal economy is larger. Participation in such nations is largely in the form of 
small one-off jobs for close social relations (e.g., baby-sitting) and for little pay resulting in small informal 
economies, whilst participation in other nations (e.g., in Southern and East-Central Europe) is more likely to be 
informal waged employment and higher informal incomes, and thus the informal economy is larger (Eurofound, 
2013).   
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the legal codes and legislation (i.e., formal institutions). Future research could therefore 
usefully analyse how formal institutions vary across countries in order to identify the 
relationship between the nature of formal institutions and the degree of institutional 
incongruence.     
  The overarching finding of this paper nevertheless, is that an institutional 
incongruence perspective appears to be a fruitful way forward for both explaining and 
tackling the informal economy. If this paper thus stimulates further evaluations of the validity 
of this institutional asymmetry explanation at other spatial scales, such as within particular 
European countries and in other global regions such as developing countries where the 
informal economy is more prevalent and thus presumably institutional incongruence far 
greater than in Europe, then it will have fulfilled one of its intentions. However, if it also leads 
governments to recognise how informal work results from such institutional incongruence and 
encourages them to begin tackling this asymmetry by changing both informal and formal 
institutions, rather than continuing to simply detect and punish those engaged in informal 
work, then this paper will have achieved its broader intention.   
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Table 1. Participation in informal economy in last 12 months, by EU member state, 2013 
Region/ country No. of 
respondents 
% of 
population 
engaged 
in 
informal 
work 
¼ HDUQHG in 
informal 
economy 
(median) 
Tax morality 
index 
EU-28 27,563 3.75 300 2.29 
Nordic nations 3,013 6 433 1.92 
Denmark 1,004 9 533 1.96 
Sweden 1,006 7 348 1.89 
Finland 1,003 3 250 1.92 
East-Central 
Europe 10,131 4 230 2.75 
Estonia 1,003 11 200 2.86 
Latvia 1,006 11 200 3.90 
Lithuania 1,027 8 290 3.08 
Croatia 1,000 7 382 2.16 
Slovenia 1,017 7 250 2.32 
Bulgaria 1,018 5 150 2.43 
Slovakia 1,000 5 265 3.05 
Czech Republic 1,000 4 195 3.06 
Hungary 1,033 4 339 2.79 
Poland 1,000 3 400 2.91 
Romania 1,027 3 288 2.34 
Western Europe  8,380 4 400 2.17 
Netherlands 1,019 11 300 2.79 
Austria 1,022 5 800 2.59 
France 1,027 5 300 2.10 
Luxembourg 505 5 500 2.26 
Belgium 1,000 4 600 2.63 
United 
Kingdom 1,306 3 502 1.98 
Germany 1,499 2 150 2.10 
Ireland 1,002 2 250 2.57 
Southern Europe 5,039 3 300 2.23 
Spain 1,003 5 225 2.00 
Greece 1,000 3 500 2.00 
Cyprus 505 2 150 1.49 
Italy 1,016 2 1000 2.38 
Portugal 1,015 2 1300 2.62 
Malta 500 1 100 1.77 
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Table 2. Level of participation in informal economy in the EU-28: by population group 
 % of 
population 
engaged in 
informal 
work 
¼HDUQHG
in 
informal 
economy 
(median)  
% of 
population 
engaged in 
informal 
work 
% of 
population 
Tax morality 
index  
All EU28 3.75 300 100 100 2.29 
Gender:      
Men 5 379 60 48 2.37 
Women 3 231 40 52 2.22 
Age:      
15-24 7 232 29 14 2.67 
25-34 6 300 26 15 2.47 
35-44 3 300 16 17 2.34 
45-54 4 250 17 18 2.31 
55-64 2 500 9 15 2.11 
65+ 1 259 3 21 1.98 
Marital status      
Married/ Remarried 2 300 32 52 2.19 
Unmarried (cohabitating) 7 343 20 11 2.51 
Unmarried (single) 6 262 34 21 2.51 
Divorce/ Separated 5 370 10 7 2.27 
Widowed/ Other 2 232 4 9 2.13 
Social class      
Working class of society 4 300 50 44 2.32 
Middle class of society 3 300 44 52 2.26 
Higher class of society 3 100 2 2 2.38 
Other/ None 9 350 4 2 2.56 
Education (age education ended):     
<15 3 339 14 20 2.13 
16-19 4 300 44 43 2.32 
20+ 3 348 25 28 2.25 
Still Studying 7 230 17 9 2.67 
People 15+ years in own household     
One 4 300 26 22 2.25 
Two 3 348 38 47 2.25 
Three 4 232 20 17 2.33 
Four and more 4 207 16 14 2.48 
Children (at least one in household)     
< 10 years old 5 339 19 15 2.29 
10-14 years old 5 300 10 8 2.29 
< 10 years old & 10-14 
years old 4 232 6 5 2.37 
No children 3 300 65 72 2.29 
Employment      
Unemployed 4 250 50 51 2.26 
Employed 4 350 50 49 2.33 
Difficulties paying bills      
Most of the time 8  250 25 13 2.47 
From time to time 4 300 32 28 2.51 
Almost never/never 3 310 43 59 2.15 
Area      
Rural area or village 4 300 34 34 2.36 
Small or middle sized town 4 300 39 40 2.27 
Large town 4 250 27 26 2.24 
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Table 3. Multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression of the propensity to engage in informal 
economy 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Tax morality 0.385***(0.0169) 0.377***(0.0171) 0.375***(0.0171) 
Gender (CG: Women):    
Men 0.688*** (0.0669) 0.756*** (0.0682) 0.757*** (0.0682) 
Age (CG: 15-24):   
25-34 -0.268** (0.127) -0.267** (0.127) -0.262** (0.127) 
35-44 -0.659*** (0.139) -0.645*** (0.139) -0.644*** (0.139) 
45-54 -0.801*** (0.142) -0.783*** (0.142) -0.791*** (0.142) 
55-64 -1.094*** (0.157) -1.108*** (0.158) -1.118*** (0.158) 
65+ -1.974*** (0.182) -2.012*** (0.190) -2.023*** (0.190) 
Marital status: (CG: Married/Remarried)   
Cohabitating 0.0894 (0.104) 0.0670 (0.105) 0.0659 (0.105) 
Single -0.0872 (0.115) -0.136 (0.116) -0.135 (0.116) 
Divorced/Separated 0.326** (0.131) 0.247* (0.132) 0.249* (0.132) 
Widowed -0.231 (0.163) -0.257 (0.165) -0.259 (0.165) 
Social class, self-assessment (CG: The working class of society)  
The middle class of society -0.313*** (0.0723) -0.166** (0.0754) -0.154** (0.0757) 
The higher class of society -0.519** (0.237) -0.283 (0.238) -0.257 (0.239) 
Other/none 0.0392 (0.227) -0.132 (0.236) -0.126 (0.236) 
Age stopped full time education (CG: 15- years):   
16-19 -0.0654 (0.117) 0.0311 (0.119) 0.0217 (0.119) 
20+ -0.0869 (0.128) 0.0715 (0.131) 0.0661 (0.131) 
Still Studying -0.176 (0.173) -0.146 (0.180) -0.142 (0.181) 
Number 15+ years in household (CG:1 person):   
2 persons -0.336***(0.106) -0.329***(0.106) -0.330***(0.107) 
3 persons -0.254**(0.117) -0.220*(0.117) -0.222*(0.118) 
4+ persons -0.340***(0.128) -0.302**(0.129) -0.300**(0.130) 
Number of children: (CG: No Children)   
Children < 10 -0.0239(0.0998) -0.0771(0.101) -0.0884(0.101) 
Children 10-14 -0.0326(0.127) -0.0741(0.128) -0.0824(0.128) 
At least one child<10 and at least one 
10-14 
-0.0273(0.153) -0.110(0.155) -0.136(0.155) 
Employment (CG: Unemployed):    
Employed  -0.204**(0.0835) -0.203**(0.0835) 
Difficulties paying bills last year (CG: Most of the time)   
From time to time  -0.472***(0.0930) -0.484***(0.0931) 
Almost never/never  -0.856***(0.0990) -0.883***(0.0991) 
Area respondent lives (CG: Rural area or village):   
Small/middle sized town   -0.0774(0.0780) 
Large town   -0.113(0.0859) 
EU Region: (CG: Western Europe)    
Southern Europe   -0.747**(0.316) 
East-Central Europe   0.0701(0.258) 
Nordic Nations   0.768**(0.377) 
Constant -3.447***(0.249) -2.933***(0.261) -2.802***(0.302) 
    
Observations 24,173 23,920 23,905 
Number of groups 28 28 28 
Random-effects Parameters    
Identity: Country      
Variance (constant) 0.372*** 0.440*** 0.275*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
